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In the Name of Parity: An Analysis of the FDIC's Proposed
Rulemaking to Preempt Certain State Banking Laws

I. INTRODUCTION
Preemption is one of the most polarizing issues in the
banking community.' The viability of the dual banking system has
always depended upon "relative competitive parity" between a
state charter and national charter. In fact, the ongoing struggle
between state and national regulators has been compared to the
swinging motion of a pendulum, in that whenever "the competitive
balance has tipped too far in one direction, Congress or the states
have stepped in to restore that balance." 3
According to many industry analysts and state regulators,
the dual banking system is currently far from balanced.4 In 2000,
state chartered banks in states with anti-predatory lending laws
accounted for nearly forty percent of the overall deposit share,
while nationally chartered bank deposits constituted roughly
twenty-two percent By 2005, these figures were approximately
thirty percent for state banks and thirty-five percent for national
banks.6 The rapidly increasing popularity of nationally chartered
banks has led many organizations, such as the Utah Association of
Financial Services and the Utah Bankers Association, to assert
that the dual banking system is in a state of "crisis" and measures

1. See Jerry W. Markham, Panel I (Part 2): A Comparative Analysis of
Consolidatedand FunctionalRegulation:Super Regulator: A ComparativeAnalysis of
Securities and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Japan,28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319 (2003).
2. Limited-Appearance Statement from Am. Banker's Ass'n, to Robert
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 3 (May 16, 2005), http://www.
fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federaU2005/05c8petition.pdf.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Letter from Johnson Fin. Group, to Robert Feldman, Executive
Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 2 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federalI2005/O5cO9prointerstate.pdf (describing the "unnecessary
costs and risks that might be avoided only by changing to a national charter").
5. Table: Preemption'sEffect?, AM. BANKER, May 25, 2006, at 1.
6. Id.
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are desperately needed to alleviate the "erosion of parity"
between state and nationally chartered institutions.7
In March of 2005, the Financial Services Roundtable
(Roundtable), a trade association for integrated financial service
companies, submitted a Petition for Rulemaking (Petition) to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).' In general, the
Petition requests that the FDIC adopt rules clearly providing that
state chartered banks operating interstate are to be "governed by a
single framework of law and regulation to the same extent as
national[ly] [chartered] banks." 9 Under the pendulum analogy,
the Roundtable argues that, in the wake of recent preemption
regulations 1 and court decisions favoring nationally chartered
banks," this Petition attempts to achieve equilibrium by tipping
the balance back in the direction of the state charter by
"provid[ing] that a state bank's home state law governs the
interstate activities of state banks and their subsidiaries to the
same extent that the National Bank Act (NBA) governs a national
bank's interstate activities.' ' 12 According to the Roundtable, not
only would its suggestions help to put state and nationally
chartered banks on a level playing field, this Petition would

7. See, e.g., Letter from Utah Ass'n of Fin. Serv. and the Utah Bankers Ass'n, to
Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1 (Dec. 13, 2005),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/O5c55prointerstate.pdf ("By some
estimates, [the percentage of assets held in state banks] could decline further in the
next few years to as little as 15% of assets. At that level, state banks will have
relatively little significance in the banking system ... ").
8. Notice of Public Hearing on Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain
State Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,413, 13,414 (Mar. 21, 2005). "The Financial Services
Roundtable represents 100 of the largest integrated financial services companies
providing banking, insurance, and investment products and services to the American
consumer. Roundtable member companies provide fuel for America's economic [sic]
accounting directly for $18.3 trillion in managed assets, $678 billion in revenue, and
2.1 million jobs." Id. at 13,417.
9. Id. at 13,417-18.
10. Id. at 13,424 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006)).
11. See, e.g., Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Watters, 431 F.3d 556 (6thCir. 2005) cert.
granted, 126 S. Ct. 2900 (2006); Wells Fargo Bank v. Boutris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir.
2005), Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005) (deferring to
OCC's construction of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006, enabling federal law to preempt state law
with respect to national bank operating subsidiaries).
12. See Notice of Public Hearing on Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain
State Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,414.
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mitigate the confusion surrounding the law applicable to the
interstate banking activities of state chartered banks. 3
On October 14, 2005, the FDIC issued a formal Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (Proposed Rulemaking) in response to the
Roundtable's Petition."' After recognizing the problem articulated
by the Roundtable and summarizing the statements and comments
received during the public hearing held on the Roundtable's
Petition on May 24, 2005, the FDIC proceeded to lay out the
rationale and terms of its Proposed Rulemaking. According to
the FDIC, its proposed rules will reflect the Congressional intent
behind the Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997 (Riegle-Neal
II),6 which mandates the equal application of host state law to
state and nationally chartered bank branches. 7 Although the
FDIC seems to agree with the Roundtable that measures should
be taken to increase parity, the FDIC makes several significant
amendments to the Roundtable's suggestions. 8
This Note argues that, if finalized, the FDIC's Proposed
Rulemaking would provide only a small increase in parity between
state and nationally chartered institutions, leaving many interstate
banking issues untouched.' 9 At the same time, it may significantly
undermine the ability of states to enforce their own consumer
protection laws. 0 Part II of this Note explains how two provisions
13. Id.
14. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019 (Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 331 and
362) (presenting the FDIC's Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The discussion in this
Note will be limited to the FDIC's proposed regulation relating to Section 24(j) of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act), which is to be codified at C.F.R. pt.
362.
15. See id. at 60,022 (noting that instead of directly replying to the Roundtable,
the "[i]ssuance of the proposed rules serves as the FDIC's response to the rulemaking
petition").
16. Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-24, 111 Stat. 238 (codified
at 12 U.S.C. Secs. 36, 1811, 1831 (2000)).
17. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest
Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,024 (quoting, among others, Rep. Marge
Roukema, Riegle-Neal II's principal sponsor, who stated that "the essence of
[Riegle-Neal II] is to provide parity between State-chartered banks and national
banks," and that it "is critical to the survival of the dual banking system." 143 CONG.
REC. H3,088-89 (daily ed. May 21, 1997) (statement of Rep. Roukema)).
18. See infra notes 38-73 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 42-61 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
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of the Proposed Rulemaking, proposed C.F.R. sections
362.19(a)(4) 21 and 362.19(c), 22 will affect the current preemption
landscape with regards to competitive parity and consumer
protection. 23 Part III concludes that although the FDIC has
several legitimate reasons to delay enactment of the Proposed
Rulemaking, there are also a few amendments that the FDIC
should implement as a means of generating greater parity and

heightened consumer protection. 4
II. How THE PROPOSED

RULEMAKING WILL AFFECT EXISTING
LAW

A.

The Law CurrentlyApplied to Activities Conducted at a
Branch

Presently, section 24(j) of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Act (FDI Act)25 sets forth the law applicable to the activities of
branches of out-of-state banks operating within other states.26 This
section essentially provides that the host state, the state that is
acting as host to the out-of-state state or nationally chartered
branch, shall apply its laws to the activities of an out-of-state state
branch only if these laws apply to national banks conducting those

21. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,031 (Oct. 14, 2005) (defining "activity conducted
at a branch" to mean "an activity of, by, through, in, from, or substantially involving a
branch").
22. Id. (requiring the issuance of a writing from a federal court or the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency to determine whether an activity will be subject to
the laws of the host state).
23. See infra notes 25-97 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
25. Federal Deposit Insurance Incorporation Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. §§ 18111835a (2000). Section 24(j) is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1)(2000).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1)(2000). Section 240), in its entirety, states:
The laws of a host state, including laws regarding community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and establishment
of intrastate branches, shall apply to any branch in the host State
of an out-of-State State bank to the same extent as such State laws
apply to a branch in the host State of an out-of-State national
bank. To the extent host State law is inapplicable to a branch of an
out-of-State State bank in such host State pursuant to the
preceding sentence, home State law shall apply to such branch.
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same activities in the host state.27 If the host state's laws do not
apply to the activities being conducted by the national bank, the
out-of-state state bank will be governed by its home state's laws. 9
Although seemingly straightforward on its face, state
chartered banks doing business across state lines face a myriad of
uncertainties regarding which state's law is applicable to certain
activities. 29 For example, Jean D. Winnike, Senior Vice President
and Counsel of State Central Bank in Iowa, described in her
comment letter to the FDIC the cost and confusion associated with
determining which law would apply to State Central Bank when it
tried to promote a new home equity product in facilities located
near state lines. 3° State Central Bank was notified by the company
that provides its lending forms that, if State Central Bank wanted
to promote this product in neighboring states, it would have to
purchase entirely different forms for each state due to the
discrepancies in those states' laws relating to home equity
products.31 Since all of its branches are located in Iowa, State
Central Bank was hesitant to incur the costs of developing four
different sets of forms, but it was forced to comply to meet the
needs of its many interstate customers. 32 In short, this lingering
problem caused significant delays in the introduction of the home
equity product for State Central Bank.33 Nationally chartered
banks, on the other hand, face little uncertainty with regard to the
applicable law, and rarely pay compliance costs as a precaution
due to the uniform set of rules found in the NBA.34
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable, to Robert Feldman,
Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Nov. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c48prointerstate.pdf
(noting that, unlike their
nationally chartered counterparts, "there is widespread confusion and uncertainty
with respect to applicable law governing state banks engaged in interstate banking
activities").
30. Letter from State Central Bank, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. (Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/
2005/05c04prointerstate.pdf ("[A number of State Central Bank's branch] locations
put the bank in a 'tri-state area' at both ends of the state - Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri
at the southern end and Iowa, Illinois and Wisconsin at the northern end.").
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable to Robert Feldman, supra
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Officials representing state chartered banks have also
questioned why preemption is triggered only when activities are
conducted at an out-of-state branch in the first place. For
example, Dennis Long, Chief Executive Officer of The Bank of
the Pacific, chartered in the State of Washington, described in his
comment letter to the FDIC the costs associated with servicing
clients in the neighboring state of Oregon through its Oregon
offices.35 Since the Oregon offices are not branches, they are not
permitted to provide full service banking to their customers,
which, in turn, results in the costs associated with shipping deposits
back to Washington. 36 Long notes that he and his customers do
not understand why these compliance costs are necessary on one
side of the Columbia River but not the other, and that the
Proposed Rulemaking would be a "welcome improvement. ,3
B.

Defining "Activities Conducted at a Branch"
1. Expanding Preemption of Host-State Law

The Proposed Rulemaking attempts to alleviate the types
of problems encountered by state chartered banks, such as The
Bank of the Pacific and State Central Bank, by defining section
24(j)'s phrase "activity conducted at a branch."38 According to the
Proposed Rulemaking, the phrase will mean "an activity of, by,
through, in, from, or substantially involving a branch" (New
Definition). 39 By clarifying that the connection between the
activity and the branch need only be a loose connection, the New
Definition will generally have the effect of allowing more
note 29 (noting that the national banks and federal thrifts can conduct interstate
activities under a uniform set of rules).
35. See Letter from The Bank of the Pacific, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2005/05c02prointerstate.pdf (explaining the cost and confusion associated
with deposit-taking across state lines).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Federal Deposit Insurance Incorporation Act of 1950, 12 U.S.C. §§ 18111835a (2000). Section 24(j) is codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1)(2000).
39. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,019, 60,031 (Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R.
362.19(a)(4)).
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interstate branch activities to remain subject to home state law.4 °
In the case of State Central Bank, if the Proposed Rulemaking is
enacted, the activities conducted by the branches located near
state lines would clearly not require State Central Bank to
purchase four
separate sets of forms, thereby decreasing the cost
•
41
of compliance.
2. Limited Parity
The FDIC's New Definition, however, stops far short of
allowing the degree of preemption requested by the Roundtable.42
Indeed, the Roundtable requested that host-state law be
preempted whenever the activity is conducted by the branch in the
host state, by an operating subsidiary, or by "any other lawful
means." 43 This provision of the Petition is clearly a response to the

40. See id. at 60,022-25. Before the issuance of this provision, there was no
definition for the phrase "activities conducted at a branch," hence the confusion
surrounding applicable law. See, e.g., supra note 29 and accompanying text
(describing the uncertainty felt by state chartered banks participating in interstate
banking with regards to the applicable law). The New Definition was designed by the
FDIC to further the congressional intent behind Riegle-Neal II, which sought to
achieve parity between state and national charters.
See supra note 17 and
accompanying text. But see Letter from Comerica Bank, to Robert Feldman,
Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2005/05cl2prointerstate.html (arguing that use of the word
"substantially" may have the effect of undermining the Congressional intent behind
Riegle-Neal II).
41. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
42. Compare Notice of Public Hearing on Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt
Certain State Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,413, 13,414 (Mar. 21, 2005) (providing an
overview of each of the five areas in which the Roundtable would like the FDIC to
issue a rulemaking, one of which is "the law applicable to activities conducted by an
operating subsidiary) with Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking;
Federal Interest Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,025 (proposed Oct. 14, 2005)
(to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 331 and 362) (admitting that "the plain language of
section 24(j)(1) indicates that it preempts host state law only with respect to a branch
in the host state of the out-of-state, state bank").
43. Notice of Public Hearing on Petition for Rulemaking to Preempt Certain
State Laws, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,414. Specifically, the Roundtable's Petition requested
that the FDIC:
make clear that "home" state law applies to an out-of-state state
bank in a "host" state to the same extent as the National Bank Act
applies to an out-of-state national bank, whether the business of
the bank is conducted by the bank through the host state branch,
by or through an operating subsidiary, or by any other lawful
means.
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regulations issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC) in 2001, which specify that state law applies to
national bank operating subsidiaries only to the extent that state
law applies to the national bank itself." The FDIC's Proposed
Rulemaking, however, effectively declines the Roundtable's
request.45 Noting the repeated use of the word "branch" in section
240J), 4 6 the FDIC admits that the "plain language" of section
240)(1) serves as a clear indication that host state law is only
meant to be preempted by branch related activities. 4 Thus, the
New Definition does not alter the status quo with regard to the law
applicable to operating subsidiaries of out-of-state state banks or

44. Id. at 13,424 (referring to 12 C.F.R. 7.4006 (2006)).
45. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest
Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,025 (here, the FDIC concedes that the plain
language of 240) will not permit the activities of out-of-state, state-chartered, nonbranch entities to preempt host state law, a concession the Roundtable was not
willing to make).
46. Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-24, 111 Stat. 238
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j)(1) (2000). Note the repeated use of the word
"branch" in section 240):
(j) Activities of branches of out-of-State banks. (1) Application of
host State law. The laws of a host State, including laws regarding
community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending, and
establishment of intrastate branches, shall apply to any branch in
the host State of an out-of-State State bank to the same extent as
such State laws apply to a branch in the host State of an out-ofState national bank. To the extent host State law is inapplicable to
a branch of an out-of-State State bank in such host State pursuant
to the preceding sentence, home State law shall apply to such
branch.
Id. (emphasis added).
47. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,025. But see Letter from the Financial Services
Roundtable, supra note 29, at 22-23 (asserting that the FDIC's plain language reading
"gives undue, talismanic weight to the word 'branch' and in doing so undercuts the
achievement of the parity intended by Congress."). It is worth noting that, by
conceding that Section 240) was drafted to deal only with "state banks that have
interstate branches," the FDIC avoided the bulk of authority-based challenges that
were asserted against the Roundtable's Petition. See, e.g., Comment Letter from
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of New York, writing in response to the
Roundtable's Petition on behalf of the Attorneys General of the States a of
Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Vermont, to Robert
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 2-7 (May 16, 2005),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/O5c6petition.pdf (arguing that the
FDIC lacks the authority to implement the Roundtable's Petition, and that any
attempt to do so would be in violation of the original purposes of the FDIC and the
Congressional intent of Riegle-Neal II).
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any other activities that are conducted without the involvement of
a branch.48
Not surprisingly, the FDIC's restraint on this topic has been
criticized by entities such as World's Foremost Bank, which,
without maintaining a branch in any state, issue "standardized
products" to countless card bearers and must incur the steep
compliance costs associated with serving fifty different
jurisdictions.49 Unless World's Foremost Bank begins coordinating
its activities with out-of-state branches, the New Definition will
have little to offer.5 ° SunTrust Banks was similarly disappointed
that the expanded preemption offered under the Proposed
Rulemaking did not cover state chartered banks' non-branch
activities." SunTrust illustrated its concern by noting that, unlike
the subsidiaries of its nationally chartered counterparts, SunTrust's
subsidiaries must meet rigorous nation-wide compliance criteria,
necessitating the full-time employment of persons who "examin[e]
files for state law compliance, prepar[e] for state examinations and
audits, and maintain[] licensing, lending and reporting
requirements in each of these jurisdictions."5 2 National bank
subsidiaries, by contrast, are rarely subject to state licensing
requirements, lending laws, or mandated disclosures and
statements. 3
Curiously, by defining an "activity conducted at a branch"
to include activities "substantially involving a branch,"54 the FDIC
may have actually narrowed the field of permissible activities that

48. But see infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text (noting that the New
Definition potentially allows the actions of other parties, including non-banks, to use
the new, looser connection required between activity and a branch to preempt host
state law).
49. Comment Letter from World's Foremost Bank, to Robert Feldman,
Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1-2 (Dec. 12, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2005/05cl0prointerstate.pdf.
50. See id.
51. Comment Letter from SunTrust Banks, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2005/05cl8prointerstate.html.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,031 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 362.19(a)(4))
(emphasis added).
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may be conducted by an out-of-state state bank, rather than
expanding it. 5 That is, since nationally chartered banks will
benefit from preemption whether or not their branches are
substantially involved,56 requiring the activities of state chartered
banks to substantially involve a branch will create a chasm
between the regulation of state and national bank activities." For
this reason, the Roundtable has requested that the FDIC delete
this language, or, "at a minimum," supplement this provision with
language indicating that substantial involvement may mean "any
formal involvement or role of the branch, any involvement of a
branch employee, any use of systems or facilities serving the
branch, or any other type of contact with the branch."'58
Ultimately, however, the substantial involvement
requirement may not exacerbate the difference in parity because,
under the language of the Proposed Rulemaking, substantial
relation to a branch is merely a sufficient, but not a necessary,
condition to trigger preemption. 9 That is, even if a state chartered
bank's activities do not substantially involve a branch, the laws of
the host state may nevertheless be preempted if the bank's
activities meet the lesser requirement of being conducted
"through" a branch or "from" a branch.6° As such, it is not clear
why a state chartered bank would ever argue that its activities in
question are "substantially" related to a branch, when it could just

55. Comment Letter from the Ga. Dept. of Banking and Finance, to Robert
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.fdic/
gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c05prointerstate.pdf.
56. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4009 (2004) (providing that "[e]xcept where made applicable by
Federal law, State laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank's ability to
fully exercise its powers to conduct activities authorized under Federal law do not
apply to national banks.").
57. Letter from the Wis. Bankers Ass'n, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/
2005/05cl7prointerstate.html.
58. Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable to Robert Feldman, supra
note 29 (providing a detailed discussion of the sources of authority that the FDIC
might rely on were it to expand the scope of preemption to cover non-branch
activities).
59. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. at 60,031 (allowing the preemption of host state law when an
activity is conducted "of, by, through, in, from, or substantially involving a branch").
60. Id.
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as easily argue that the same activities are being conducted
"through" a branch.61
C.

The Writing Requirement

Another important difference between the FDIC's
Proposed Rulemaking and the Roundtable's Petition is the FDIC's
addition of 12 C.F.R. § 362.19(c) (Writing Requirement). This
section provides that the laws of the host state will not apply to the
activities of an out-of-state state bank as long as a federal court or
the OCC "has determined in writing that the particular host State
62
law does not apply.,
In a sense, the FDIC's rationale for inserting this provision
is logical, as the OCC or a federal court is well positioned to
determine whether host state law applies to a particular activity of
a branch of an out-of-state national bank.6' Further, in theory this
procedure should not be unduly burdensome since it is like "the
consultations that the FDIC engages in currently when making
determinations regarding the permissible activities of a national
bank under section 24(a) of the FDI Act." 64
The Writing Requirement, however, has been met with

nearly universal disapproval. It has been argued that not only
does this measure fail to help put state chartered banks on equal
footing with nationally chartered banks, this provision is actually a
significant competitive step backwards for state chartered banks.66
61. Id.
62. Id. at 60,031 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 362.19(c)) (providing that: A host
State law does not apply to an activity conducted at a branch in the host State of an
out-of-State, State bank to the same extent that a Federal court or the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency has determined in writing that the particular host State
law does not apply to an activity conducted at a branch in the host State of an out-ofState, national bank.
63. Id. at 60,025.
64. Id. at 60,025 (citing 12 U.S.C. 1831a(a)). But see Letter from Arnold &
Porter, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005),
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/O5c26prointerstate.pdf (noting that
"it would be unlikely that the OCC would issue separate letters for each of the fifty
states stating that the same activity is permissible under federal law in that state").
65. See e.g., Letter from Conference of State Bank Supervisors, to Robert
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.
gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/O5c5lprointerstate.html.
66. Letter from First-Citizens Bank & Trust Company, to Robert Feldman,
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David Sorrell and Robert Braswell, Commissioner and
Georgia
of the
respectively,
Appointee,
Commissioner
Department of Banking and Finance, assert that a state bank
should be able to determine the law applicable to its activities by
relying on whether or not a similarly situated national bank is
reliance
that
this
disregarding a certain state law.67 It follows
•
•
•
68
permission.
need
for
written
obviate
the
method would
Moreover, in instances where there is no particular ruling
on the activity, the state bank would effectively be held captive to
the OCC's writing, which could render state banks less competitive
"than they were ... before the rule." 69 Indeed, since the OCC is
not required to respond to any of these inquiries, the Writing
Requirement might effectively compel state banks to seek
applicable law determinations from federal courts on each
individual host state law.70 This would be a menacing notion for
any commercial entity and certainly an expensive regulatory
encumbrance for banks." Additionally, the OCC would seem to
have little incentive to issue a speedy response to its state bank
competitor. 7' For this reason, several commenters have mentioned
that if the FDIC is determined to include the Writing
Requirement, it should at least be implemented with a timing
clause, wherein if the FDIC or the OCC does not respond to a

Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c2lprointerstate.html.
67. Letter from Ga. Dept. of Banking and Finance to Robert Feldman, supra
note 55; see also, Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable to Robert Feldman,
supra note 29, at 5 (noting that since the OCC frequently adopts rules that "broadly
preempt categories of state law, rather than 'particular' state laws," coupled with the
"fact that the OCC now rarely makes written determinations addressing a specific
state law or rule," this provision would only frustrate the pursuit of parity).
68. Letter from Ga. Dept. of Banking and Finance to Robert Feldman, supra
note 55.
69. Id.
70. See id. at 2.
71. See e.g., Letter from Conference of State Bank Supervisors to Robert
Feldman, supra note 65.
72. Letter from Rep. Barney Frank and Rep. Luis Gutierrez, U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on Fin. Serv., to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/
2005/05c54prointerstate.pdf.
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bank's petition to preempt the laws of a host state within a certain
time, the bank may proceed to follow its home state's law.73
D.

Consumer Protection Concerns

At the other end of the spectrum, consumer advocacy
groups are claiming that the Proposed Rulemaking, particularly
the New Definition, will significantly compromise the ability of
states to enforce and monitor their own consumer protection
laws.74 Under the New Definition, it seems possible that "nonbank vendors and alternative financial service providers,
such
as
• .
,,71
those who offer payday loans and refund anticipation loans, may
conduct some small portion of their business "through, 76 a branch,
perhaps even via the internet, as a means of triggering the
preemption language in the New Definition.7 7 This "loophole
effect" is precisely what concerns the National Consumer Law
Center. 8 Essentially, since some portion of the activity need only
be performed "through" the branch of a bank, there appears to be
nothing preventing third parties, such as "mortgage brokers,
appraisers, loan closing agents, title insurance companies, and
credit insurance companies" from preempting the laws of their
host state.79 For this reason, the National Consumer Law Center
73. Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable to Robert Feldman, supra
note 29.
74. See e.g., Letter from the Nat'l Consumer Law Center to Robert Feldman
(Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/O5c22prointer
state.html.
75. Official Testimony of Yolanda D. McGill, Center for Responsible Lending,
on Petition for Rule-Making to Permit Preemption of State Laws With Respect to
the Interstate Activities of State Banks (May 24, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
news/conferecnces/agency/public-mcgil/test2.html.
76. 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,031 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. 362.19(a)(4)).
77. Letter from Nat'l Cmty. Capital, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/
2005/05cl3prointerstate.html.
78. See e.g., Letter from Nat'l Consumer Law Center to Robert Feldman, supra
note 74.
79. Id. The National Consumer Law Center buttresses this point by raising the
interesting question of whether the state certification and licensing requirements
established by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA) will be trumped by the Definitional Change, such that the appraisers will
be governed by the laws of their home state rather than the laws of the state in which
they do business. Id.
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has suggested that the FDIC narrow its definition of "activity
conducted at a branch" to read, "an activity conducted by the
branch at its facility in the host state." 8 Such an amendment,
however, would clearly run contrary to the FDIC's overall goal of
expanding the scope of preemption."' In fact, the FDIC readily
acknowledges that the scope of the Proposed Rulemaking is "not
limited to particular areas or subjects, but is broader and might
preempt host state laws dealing with lending, deposit-taking and
other banking activities." 82
Each consumer protection related argument can be traced
out to the larger debate concerning whether the Proposed
Rulemaking will spawn a "race to the bottom," wherein banks will
have the incentive to move their operations to states with more
lenient consumer protection laws, and "export" these laws to
states with stricter standards.83 On the face of the Proposed
Rulemaking, there seems to be nothing preventing this
phenomenon.8 There are, however, numerous counterarguments
85
to the race to the bottom theory. Practically, one may question
why a bank would choose to evade state regulations and consumer
protection laws by converting from one state charter to another
state charter when switching to a national charter would be a more
certain route to achieve the same ends&6 Even under the race to

80. Id.
81. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
82. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest Rate
Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019, 60,025 (Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts.
331 and 362).
83. Letter from Housing Educ. and Econ. Dev., to Robert Feldman, Executive
Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regualations/
laws/federal/2005/05c20prointerstate.html.
84. Id.
85. Letter from Wisconsin Dep't of Fin. Institutions, to Robert Feldman,
Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c08prointerstate.html.
("Considerations that are
important to the efficient and profitable operation of [credit card banks and others]
will determine where banks will be located, not which state has lax consumer
protection laws.").
86. Letter from Comerica Bank, supra note 40 (arguing that use of the word
"substantially" may have the effect of undermining the Congressional intent behind
Riegle-Neal II). But see, Yolanda McGill & Kathleen Keest, Comments on Petition
for Rule-Making to Permit Preemption of State Laws with Respect to the Interstate
Activities of State Banks (May 16, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/news/conferences/
agency/public-mcgill/test.html (pointing out that a race to the bottom did occur when
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the bottom theory, some state's consumer protection laws will
apply, and the notion that state regulators will intentionally use the
preemptive effects of the Proposed Rulemaking to attract charters
and exploit the consumer friendly laws of sister states seems
dubious on two counts.8' First, there is little historical evidence
suggesting that state regulators are anything but zealously
motivated to protect their citizenry. Secondly, it has been argued
that serious abuses would likely expose culpable state regulators to
an adverse political reaction. 89
The speculation over whether or not the Proposed
Rulemaking will actually result in a race to the bottom is endless. 9°
As a policy matter, however, it would seem hard to justify the
issuance of a rulemaking that could potentially have such
deleterious effects on the economically vulnerable. 9 Moreover,

"South Dakota and Delaware - two states representing only about 1.5 million of the
nation's 281.4 million citizens - made [a conscious decision to preempt state laws
regulating non-mortgage credit]").
87. Letter from Comerica Bank, supra note 40.
88. See, e.g., id. It is notable that industry groups have consistently employed this
counterargument when nearly every state regulator asserts that there will be a race to
the bottom. Id.
89. See generally, Letter from Comerica Bank, supra note 40 (doubting the
existence of "'no rule' states that have chosen to eliminate consumer protections in
favor of economic development" and noting that "state officials work very hard to
protect their constituents"). But see McGill & Keest, supra note 86 (noting that
South Dakota and Delaware are examples of how the "'preemption by exportation'
phenomenon put the 'consumer-friendly' state at a disadvantage to the 'bankfriendly' states").
90. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Interstate Banking; Federal Interest
Rate Authority, 70 Fed. Reg. 60,019 (Oct. 14, 2005) (to be codified at C.F.R. pts. 331
and 362). In the introductory text preceding the Proposed Rulemaking, the FDIC
summarizes many of the conflicting views held by those who commented on the
proposal. Id.
91. Letter from the Home Ownership Preservation Project of the Legal
Assistance Found. of Metropolitan Chicago, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2005/05c23prointerstate.pdf (citing a study by the Woodstock Institute
demonstrating that "in the Chicago area, subprime loans are 30 times more likely to
go into foreclosure"). The Illinois High-Risk Home Loan Act, which has had the
effect of mitigating some of the most severe predatory lending abuses, would likely
be preempted on more occasions under the Proposed Rulemaking. Id. See also
Letter from the Greater Rochester Cmty. Reinvestment Coalition, to Robert
Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Nov. 22, 2005), http://
www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c57prointerstate.html
(asserting that
the Proposed Rulemaking will chip away at New York consumer protection laws at a
time when African-Americans and Hispanics in the Rochester area are "twice as
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the Proposed Rulemaking currently provides no mechanism by
which consumers may rectify such abuses. 92 That is, if the citizens
of State A feel harmed by the exported laws of State B, the
citizens of State A can only hope that State B voters will seek
political redress, unless, of course, the citizens of State A
understand that their own state's law is being preempted 93and
consequently take their business to banks chartered in State A.
One possible way of curbing the effects of a race to the
bottom is for the FDIC to include a mandatory disclosure
provision requiring banks to inform customers of the applicable
state law. 94 While such disclosures theoretically would alert
consumers that their own state law may not be applicable, the
manner in which such disclosures would manifest themselves in the
marketplace is uncertain. 9 For example, it is unlikely that such
provisions will be beneficial to consumers unless banks are
required to make a "clear and conspicuous" disclosure, separate
from any boilerplate language, that clearly notifies consumers that
their own state's law is inapplicable. 96 As noted, however, many

likely as non-Hispanic whites to be denied mortgage loans" and "2.25 times more
likely [than non-Hispanic whites] to receive high cost loans").
92. See Letter from the Center for Responsible Lending, to Robert Feldman,
Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/
regulations/laws/federal/2005/05c3lprointerstate.pdf (arguing that the Proposed
Rulemaking should include an "opt-out" provision which will enable host states to
prevent other states from exporting their laws inside the host state's boundaries).
93. Id.
94. See Comments of the National Consumer Law Center, supra note 74
(asserting that such a provision "could have a salutary affect on the market when
banks realize that consumers prefer to deal with local entities who apply local law to
the relationship"). In its General Council Letter No. 11, the FDIC noted the
importance of disclosure statements with regard to the exportation of interest rates,
stating that "[i]nterstate State Banks should make an appropriate disclosure to the
customer that the interest to be charged on the loan is governed by applicable federal
law and the law of the relevant state which will govern the transaction." General
Counsel Op. No. 11, Interstate Charges by Interstate State Banks, 63 Fed. Reg.
27,282 (May 18, 1998).
95. Id.
96. Id. (suggesting that the FDIC adopt a phrase which provides: "In consumer
transactions, as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1602, an insured state bank shall disclose to
the consumer the identity of the state whose law governs the transaction. The notice
shall be made clearly and conspicuously in writing and shall be segregated from all
other information. The insured state bank shall make the disclosure before
consummation.")
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financial institutions themselves are confused about whether or
not the host state's law applies.97

III. CONCLUSION
Regardless of what the FDIC ultimately decides to do, its
decision will be met with cautious enthusiasm and vigorous
criticism. 98 Given the uncertainty surrounding the OCC's recent
decisions regarding operating subsidiaries, 99 coupled with the
throng of plausible consumer protection related concerns,100
continued inaction may be the FDIC's wisest course.101
On the other hand, if the FDIC wants to achieve its stated
goal of achieving more competition between national and state
charters, it should amend the Proposed Rulemaking by removing
the Writing Requirement or the "substantial involvement"
language from the New Definition, as these provisions may
actually make state charters less competitive. 102
Such an
amendment would no doubt broaden the scope of preemption, and
pacify many banks and non-banks with interstate interests.0 3 The
outcry from consumer advocacy groups and state regulators,
however, would be deafening. 4 An interesting middle ground,
therefore, might entail making the aforementioned changes, but
inserting a disclosure provision requiring banks to notify their
customers of the applicable state law. '0' Regardless, as a

97. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
101. See Letter from the Center for Responsible Lending, supra note 92. Contra
Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 29 (noting that the
Proposed Rulemaking is "timely and critical for the future of the dual banking
system," which is "at an historic crossroads"); see also Letter from Branch Banking &
Trust Company, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec.
16, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/federal/ 2005/05c49prointerstate.html
(asserting that, due to the "critical nature of this issue," the FDIC should "implement
the present proposal, and then immediately being to address the other matters
suggested in the Roundtable's Petition").
102. Letter from the Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 29 (requesting
these and other amendments).
103. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
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procedural matter it would be worthwhile to gather more ideas by
holding another public hearing based on the Proposed
Rulemaking before any final decisions are made, given the
substantial differences between the FDIC's Proposed Rulemaking
and the Roundtable's Petition.' °6
E. LANG HUNTER

106. Letter from the Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, to Robert Feldman, Executive Sec'y,
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/
federal/2005/05c38prointerstate.pdf.

